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KANT ON RECOGNIZING OUR DUTIES AS 
GOD'S COMMANDS 
John E. Hare 
Kant both says that we should recognize our duties as God's commands, and objects to 
the theological version of heteronomy, 'which derives morality from a divine and 
supremely perfect will'. In this paper I discuss how these two views fit together, and in 
the process I develop a notion of autonomous submission to divine moral authority. I 
oppose the 'constitutive' view of autonomy proposed by J. B. Schneewind and 
Christine Korsgaard. I locate Kant's objection to theological heteronomy against the 
background of Crusius's divine command theory, and I compare Kant's views about 
divine authority and human political authority. 
1. Kant on Religion and Morality 
I am going to focus on Kant's view that we should recognize our duties 
as God's commands, and on how this fits with his more familiar objection 
in the Groundwork to the theological version of heteronomy, 'which derives 
morality from a divine and supremely perfect will'. But before we get to 
that, I want to make a general point about Kant's view of the relation 
between morality and the Christian faith. We have tended to secularize 
Kant in a way that distorts the meaning of the texts. There has been a ten-
dency to see modern philosophy as teleological, headed towards the death 
of God and the death of metaphysics heralded by Nietzsche at the end of 
the nineteenth century. The modern classics have accordingly been 
trimmed to fit this model by their twentieth century admirers. What we 
need to do is to recapture what I call 'the vertical dimension' of their 
thought. In the case of Kant, he is, in his own phrase, a 'pure rationalist'.l 
A pure rationalist is someone who 'recognizes revelation, but asserts that 
to know and accept it as real is not a necessary requisite to religion.' 
Implicit in this description is a distinction between two kinds of religion. 
In his second preface to Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone Kant sug-
gests we think of revelation as two concentric circles. Historical revelation 
(for example, Scripture), which is given to particular people at particular 
times, belongs in the outer circle. Kant's project is to see if he can translate 
the items in this outer circle into the language of the inner circle, which is 
the revelation to reason, and is the same to all people at all times. Being a 
pure rationalist means that the items in the outer circle are not rejected, but 
they are held not to be necessary for all rational beings to come to saving 
faith. They are, Kant says, vehicles of the religion within the limits of reason 
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alone. He himself and his European contemporaries have been introduced 
to God's requirements by this historical revelation, and Kant thinks it 
important that biblical preaching should continue and be kept under disci-
pline, so that this vehicle can be maintained. He is not, then, rejecting spe-
cial revelation in favor of morality. But Kant wants to use morality to 
translate as much as he can of special revelation into the language of rea-
son. The translation exercise is going to show, if it is successful, that the 
two circles are indeed concentric, which is at least to say that they are con-
sistent with each other. More than this, a life centred in one will also be 
centred in the other.2 
On my reading of Kant's project, he finds that there are some items in the 
outer circle which he cannot translate, but which he needs to continue to 
believe in order to have morality make rational sense. Conspicuous among 
these items is the belief in divine grace. Kant believes in a strong version of 
the doctrine of original sin, that we are born under the dominion of the 'evil 
maxim', which makes us subordinate our duty to our own happiness. Kant 
also believes that we cannot by our own devices overcome this dominion, 
because it already underlies all our choices. We therefore require assistance 
from outside ourselves to accomplish what he calls 'the revolution of the 
will', by which the ranking of happiness over duty is reversed. Kant's can-
didate for this outside assistance is what he caBs 'a divine supplement', and 
he holds that we have to believe that this is available if we are to hold our-
selves accountable to the moral law. Twentieth century exegetes have tried 
to rescue Kant from these views by what I call 'cushion hermeneutics'. This 
is the strategy of suggesting that he did not really mean some of the things 
he says, but was saying them merely to cushion his disagreement with the 
authorities.' But this kind of interpretation should be adopted only as a last 
resort, if there is no straight-forward interpretation which fits the text. 
Especially this is true of Kant, who placed such a high value on sincerity.4 
We should not use cushion hermeneutics except as a last resort, if it is the 
only possible way to make sense of the text. 
II. The 'Constitutive' View of Autonomy 
Contemporary secular Kantians have interpreted Kant's views about 
autonomy as a form of creative anti-realism. I will interpret him, rather, as 
what I will call a 'transcendent realist', namely someone who believes that 
there is something beyond the limitations of our understanding.s In partic-
ular there is a God who is head of the kingdom of which we are merely 
members. When we recognize something as our duty we are in some way 
recapitulating the will of this head of the kingdom just as when we believe 
something true about the world we are in some way recapitulating the 
way things are in themselves. This is a traditional picture of Kant as an 
empirical realist, a transcendental idealist, and a transcendent realist. But 
interpreting Kant's view of autonomy as a form of creative anti-realism has 
been typical of Rawlsians such as Christine Korsgaard and J.B. 
Schneewind, and this interpretation has become very influentia1.6 
Christine Korsgaard takes the view that our reflective endorsement of a 
prescription makes that prescription normative; it is the source of obliga-
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tion, or even of all value.' Thus if a Mafioso can endorse reflectively the 
judgement that he should go out and kill, then he sholiid. If human beings 
decided that human life was worthless, then it would be worthless. She 
says, 'The point is just this: if one holds the view, as I do, that obligations 
exist in the first-person perspective, then in one sense the obligatory is like 
the visible: it depends on how much of the light of reflection is on.' I hasten 
to add that Korsgaard goes on to say that the Mafioso has a deeper obliga-
tion to give up his immoral role. But she feels that she has to concede ini-
tially that the Mafioso has the obligation to do the hideous thing, because 
of her position that 'it is the endorsement that does the work' (that is, the 
normative work). 
J.B. Schneewind's magisterial history of modern ethics leading up to 
Kant lays out, in Kant's name, what Schneewind calls a 'constitutive' 
method of ethics. Here is a statement of this view from an earlier article, 
'Reflecting on one's motives one finds oneself giving them a unique kind of 
approval or disapproval; in any particular situation one is to act from the 
approved motive or set of motives, and the act so motivated is the appro-
priate action. There is no other source of rightness or wrongness in 
actions.'s Schneewind thinks this endorsement is the SOllrce of tile rightness 
of the action. That is what makes his method 'constitutive', or a kind of 
constructivism or creative anti-realism. Schneewind goes on to use the lan-
guage of creation, saying that our possession of a constitutive method of 
ethics 'shows that we create the moral order in which we live, and supply 
our own motives for compliance.,q The view is that if any other will, or 
anything external to us, or even our own non-rational appetites are the 
source of the normativity, then we are not free but slaves. 
1 have doubts about this kind of creative anti-realism in ethics, both in 
itself and as an interpretation of Kant. The best place to see why it does not 
fit Kant is those passages where Kant, throughout his writings, describes 
God as the head of the kingdom of which we are mere members, and 
where he says we should recognize our duties as God's commands to us. 
In these passages Kant denies that God is the author or creator of the moral 
demand, because Kant thinks this demand does not have an author at all. 
But if it does not have an author, then we cannot be either its author or its 
creator. One passage is from the report of his lectures on ethics from 1775-
80, 'No one, not even God, can be the author of the laws of morality, since 
they have no origin in will, but instead a practical necessity. But the moral 
laws can nevertheless be subject to a lawgiver (unter einem Gesetzgeber ste-
hen). There can exist a being which has the power and authority to execute 
these laws, to declare that they are in accordance with his will, and to 
impose upon every one the obligation of acting in accordance with them. 
This being is therefore the lawgiver, though not the author of the laws.'l0 
Kant revises this position in the Groundwork (1785), but what looks 
like a radical revision is not. He says, it is true, that we are authors of 
the law. But this is because he has made a distinction not present in the 
earlier discussion between two kinds of author. There is the author of 
the law and there is the author of the obligation in accordance with the 
law. Put carefully, it turns out that God and we can be seen as jointly 
authors in the one sense, namely authors of the obligation of the law, 
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and neither God nor we can be seen as authors in the other sense, name-
ly authors of the law directly.ll T think this is Kant's view at the time of 
the Groundwork and throughout his ethical writing thereafter. Moreover, 
saying that God and we are jointly authors of the obligation of the law 
does not mean that we are on an equal footing with God as authors in 
this sense. It does not mean that our contributions are symmetrical. 
Even in the Groundwork Kant makes this clear. He distinguishes 
between the king of the kingdom of ends and the rest of the membership 
of this kingdom, 'A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a 
member, when, although he makes its universal laws, he is also himself 
subject to these laws. He belongs to it as its head, when as the maker of 
laws he is himself subject to the will of no other'Y Kant goes on to say 
that a rational being can maintain the position of head of the kingdom 
only if he is a completely independent being, without needs and with an 
unlimited power adequate to his will. There is no doubt that Kant is 
talking about God here, as head or king of the kingdom, and without a 
king there cannot be a kingdom. There is the following asymmetry 
between the king and his subjects: We ordinary moral agents have to see 
our role as recapitulating in our own wills the declaration in God's will 
of our duties. This is how we are lawgivers; we declare a correspon-
dence of our wills with the law (which we do not create). For me to will 
the law autonomously is to make it my law. Kant has similar language 
in the Second Critique about willing that there is a God, which sounds at 
first hearing like blasphemy. But Kant means that we make God our 
God. He does not mean 'create' in either case, either that we create the 
law or that we create God. Neither God nor the law can do the job Kant 
needs them to do if we do create them. Autonomy on this reading is 
more nearly a kind of submission than a kind of creation. In what fol-
lows, I will use autonomy with this understanding, though I do not 
want to deny that the term has been used by others, especially by fol-
lowers and interpreters of Kant, in a creative anti-realist way.14 
The constructivist account of Kant has fallen into the trap of a false 
dichotomy. It is easy, but a mistake, to assume that if values are not entire-
ly independent of or external to the will, they must be entirely dependent 
on it or internal to it. One way to think of this false dichotomy is to sup-
pose that if values are not like armadillos, things we discover in the world 
outside us, they must be like armchairs, things we put into the world or 
create, our artefacts. What lies behind the appeal of this dichotomy is what 
John Austin called 'the descriptive fallacy'f appealing to Kant as the 
philosopher who first uncovered it. IS One way to be guilty of the descrip-
tivist fallacy is to assume that to know the meaning of a normative word 
like 'good' is just like knowing the meaning of 'red', namely to know what 
things we mayor may not apply it to. In But the assumption is a mistake, the 
mistake of thinking that language always works in the same kind of way. 
This is the mistake of those who think they have to move from a rejection 
of substantive moral realism, where the normativity is entirely external to 
the will, to a creati'11c anti-realism, where the normativity is created by the 
will. I am encouraged here by Karl Ameriks's response to Schneewind, 
rejecting what he calls 'the false trichotomy: either imposed by us, or 
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imposed by another, or simply "perceived" as a natural feature'.!7 Kant's 
theory is, I believe, an example of a theory which resists such a dichotomy 
or trichotomy. 
III. Christian August Crusius 
An important figure for us to consider here is Christian August 
Crusius." Kant needs to be understood against the background of the dis-
cussion of divine command theory in the pietist circles he was familiar 
with. Schneewind's history of modern ethics, together with his earlier arti-
cles, gives Crusius a key place in the development that led to Kant's views 
on autonomy. Crusius' views were influential in Konigsberg at the time 
Kant was writing, and provided a pietist alternative within philosophy to 
the rationalist doctrine of Christian Wolff. Kant's teacher, Martin Knutzen, 
undertook the project of reconciling the two. Crusius is presented by 
Schneewind as making two central points against Wolff's moral philoso-
phy. First, he introduced what Schneewind calls 'a quite novel distinction' 
between two kinds of things we ought to do; there are actions that we 
ought to do as means to some end of ours and others we ought to do regard-
less of any ends we have, even the end of our own perfection. It is only this 
second kind of obligation that Crusius is willing to call 'moral obligation'. 
Here, says Schneewind, is the origin of Kant's notion of the categorical 
imperative. Second, Crusius tied this distinction to the notion of freedom. 
He said that the will is free only because it can choose in accordance with 
this second kind of obligation. That is to say that even if we perceive 
something clearly as required for an increase in perfection, we can choose 
either for it or against it. This is contrary to Wolff because Wolff taught 
that by nature the availability of increased perfection necessarily moves us, 
and we are always obligated to pursue it. We are always drawn to act so 
as to bring about what we believe is the greatest amount of perfection, and 
Wolff savs we are bound or necessitated so to act.!O 
Now "it may seem churlish to say of a 600 page history that it has not 
given us enough of the historical context, but I think in this case it is true. 
Schneewind is wrong to say that it is 'a quite novel distinction' to distin-
guish being drawn to some end of ours as ours and being drawn regardless 
of any ends we have, even the end of our own perfection. Both this distinc-
tion and the distinctive tying of this distinction to freedom come from 
Duns Scotus, and before Scotus from Anselm. Duns Scotus holds that 
there are two affections of the will, the affection for advantage, directed to 
one's own happiness or perfection, and the affection for justice, which is 
directed to what is good in itself regardless of one's ends. For Scotus we 
are only free because we have the affection for justice. This distinction 
between the affections is to be found in both Lutheran and Reformed theol-
ogy.20 Scotism was a widely accessible option in the intellectual milieu in 
which the Reformers lived. Luther makes the point repeatedly that one 
who does the good in order to promote his own blessedness is still not 
devoted to the good itself; rather, he is using it as a means for 'climbing up 
to the Divine majesty' .21 Perhaps Crus ius came to the distinction by reflect-
ing on Luther. 
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In Scotus and in the Reformers and in Crusius, this distinction is tied 
into a version of divine command theory. Scotus thinks that God necessar-
ily loves God, and then wills to have co-lovers (though God does not will 
this necessarily). Moreover God necessarily orders these creatures towards 
union with God, their primary good. From this come the first group of the 
ten commandments. But the route to this end is not necessary, and is with-
in God's prescriptive discretion. Here we have the second group of the ten 
commandments specifying our duty to the neighbour, and these are bind-
ing upon us because God has chosen them; though they are not arbitrary, 
because they lead to our final end. Now Schneewind, like Socrates in the 
Ellthyphro, presents us with a choice: 'whether morally right acts are right 
simply because God commands us to do them, or whether, by contrast, 
God commands us to do them because they are, in themselves, right'.22 But 
the Scotist form of divine command theory does not fit this dichotomy. 
Our duties to the neighbour are right both because God chooses that route 
and because it is a route to our final good. In Crusius there is the same 
kind of structure as in Scotus. God has an essential tendency to self-affir-
mation and when God creates us (which is not necessary) God must desire 
that our strivings should be directed in accordance with our highest objec-
tive end, which is union with God. But this means, Crusius says, that our 
highest formal end is compliance with God's will and command.21 
Crusius does not merely recapitulate Scotus, however; he adds to him. I 
want to emphasize one such addition, and I want to claim that this addi-
tion is the focus of Kant's famous objection in the Groundwork to the theo-
logical version of heteronomy. The addition is most clearly seen in the 
way Crusius divides up the basic human desires. Scotus was concerned to 
deny eudaimonism, the view that all our motivation is directed towards 
happiness. He therefore divided up the affection for advantage and the 
affection for justice. Crusius is likewise opposed to eudaimonism. But for 
him there are not two but three basic categories of desire. The first is the 
drive to increase our own appropriate perfection, and from this come the 
desires for truth, darity, good reasoning, the arts, bodily improvement, 
freedom, friendship, and honour. Second comes the disinterested or impar-
tial drive for perfection, and from this comes a general desire to help oth-
ers. But third, and distinct and incommensurable with these first two, is 
what Crusius calls 'the drive of conscience' which is 'the natural drive to 
recognize a divine moral law'. His idea is that we have within us this sepa-
rate capacity to recognize divine command and to be drawn towards it out 
of a sense of dependence on the God who prescribes the command to us, 
and will punish us if we disobey (GRL 132). It is a good thing, Crusius 
thinks, that we do have this drive of conscience. For there is no way that 
most of us could most of the time reason out what we ought to do. God 
therefore gives us a 'shorter path' to knowledge of the divine law, and this 
makes God's will evident in such a way that it can come to everyone's 
knowledge (GRL 135). In this way, no-one is excused from accountability. 
What Crusius is doing is to propose a capacity humans have for receiv-
ing divine command as such, and he separates this from the mere disinter-
ested desire for perfection (or what Scotus would call the affection for jus-
tice). He is giving a particular reading of Romans I and II in which the law 
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is written 'on our hearts' and even those who 'suppress the truth' are 
'without excuse'. This drive of conscience is supposed to be a sense which 
humans quite generally have of being dependent on some higher being 
and therefore of having obligation to do what that higher being tells them 
to do. But recognizing the commands of this being and being moved to 
obey is supposed to be a different drive from recognizing intrinsic good 
and being moved to pursue it. 
Schneewind puts the distinction between Kant and Crusius this way. 
He thinks Kant is trying to show how we as moral agents can be indepen-
dent of divine legislation, and how morality can be a human creation. 
Schneewind takes Crus ius, on the other hand, to be arguing that we are 
dependent on God. Here is Schneewind's dichotomy: Either there is inde-
pendcllce of morality from God or there is a Crusian depl'1ldence. I am going 
to suggest that Kant's actual view is neither of these, and that we should 
follow Kant in this respect. 
IV. Kant's Argument about Dilline Commands in the Groundwork 
What I want to do next is to return to the brief (and famous) argument 
in the Groundwork which is often taken to be an argument against divine 
command theory. Since Kant's argument is brief, I will quote it in full. 
Kant rejects 'the theological concept which derives morality from a divine 
and supremely perfect will; not merely because we cannot intuit God's 
perfection and can only derive it from our own concepts, among which 
that of morality is the most eminent; but because, if we do not do this (and 
to do so would be to give a crudely circular explanation), the concept of 
God's will still remaining to us -one drawn from such characteristics as lust 
for glory and domination and bound up with frightful ideas of power and 
vengefulness- would inevitably form the basis for a moral system which 
would be in direct opposition to morality.'2! 
This argument has been taken, together with a brief and impenetrable 
passage in Plato's Euthyphro, as a decisive rejection of the whole idea of 
divine command theory." But I think the argument sounds quite different, 
and is a better argument, if we construe it as an attack, not on divine com-
mand theory in general, but on Crusius's particular form of it. I think the 
heart of Kant's objection is to the separation of the 'drive of conscience' as a 
separate capacity,z" 
The typical reading of this argument in twentieth century analytic phi-
losophy takes it as a refutation of the divine command theory of ethical 
obligation in general. Here, to give just one example, is R. M. Hare's ver-
dict, 'Ever since Kant, it has been possible for people to insist on the autono-
my of morals - its independence of human or divine authority. Indeed, it 
has been necessary, if they were to think morally, in the sense in which that 
word is now generally understood.'27 The claim here is that Kant has made 
it possible for us to think of morality as independent of divine or human 
authority, and that we now have to think of it that way if we want to use 
the moral words in the way most people understand them.28 R. M. Hare 
talks also of a 'God, whom Kant would have liked to believe in."g Similarly 
Lewis White Beck takes Kant to be arguing that moral duties do not owe 
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their authority in any way to being divine commands. After conceding 
that Kant talks as if he were a divine command theorist (in this sense), Beck 
says on Kant's behalf, 'It is not that (duties) are divine commands, or that 
they owe their authority over us to their being decrees of a divine lawgiver 
who also created us; for in that event, we should have to know about God 
before we could know what our dutv is, and we do not know God, while 
even the most unphilosophical person knows his duty. Moreover, such a 
theory would be incompatible with moral self-government, or autonomy."" 
So Beck interprets Kant as saying that we should regard the moral law as if 
it were a divine command, and the people under this law as if it were 'a 
people united by common allegiance to a supposed author of these com-
mands, namely God'. But the 'as if' in these contexts is stressed in such a 
way as to de~y that we should believe in the actual existence of such 
divine commands or their legislator. God's existence is not, however, for 
Kant, 'as if'.31 Kant is not an agnostic, except that he does not 'know' in his 
own very restricted sense of 'knowing', according to which we can only 
know what we could possibly experience with the senses or what is apod-
ictically certain. We do not in this sense know that God exists. But Kant 
holds that we are required to believe that God exists. In just the same sense, 
he holds that we are required to believe that God is (with us) the legislator 
of moral law, and (unlike us) the rewarder and punisher of our lives as a 
whole in relation to this law. We have to deny knowledge in order to 
make room for faith.12 
If, like most contemporary exegetes, one reads Kant's argument as an 
attack on divine command theory in general, it will naturally be construed 
as presenting the following two-horned dilemma. We have two choices 
on the divine command theory: Either we derive the notion of God's per-
fection from our moral concepts or we do not. If we do (the first horn), 
then the derivation which the divine command theory proposes is crudely 
circular. It says we have moral obligations because God commands them, 
and we should obey God's commands because they are morally right. But 
if we separate (on the second horn) our notion of God's will from the moral 
concepts, then the explanation of our obligation will depend merely on our 
ability to please God and God's ability (if we do not) to hurt us. The rela-
tionship between us, when stripped of right, will reduce to one of power. 
But then morality will be based on self-interest, and will not be what (on 
Kant's view) morality in fact is. So neither choice is available to us, and so 
the divine command theory should be rejected.J3 
This is an important argument, and I will come back to it at the end. But 
it cannot be, if Kant is consistent, Kant's argument. For Kant accepts the 
view throughout his life that we should recognize our duties as God's 
commands. For example, there is the passage in Lectures on Ethics, 'Our 
bearing towards God must be characterized by reverence, love and fear -
reverence for Him as a holy lawgiver, love for His beneficent rule, and fear 
of Him as a just judge' (which is different, Kant says, from merely being 
afraid of God when we have transgressed). 'We show our reverence by 
regarding His law as holy and righteous, by due respect for it, and by seek-
ing to fulfil it in our disposition.'34 I have already mentioned the passage in 
the Groundwork about God as the head of the kingdom of ends, and there 
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are passages in the Second Critique and Religion within the Limits of Reason 
Alone about recognizing our duties as God's commands." Because this is a 
sustained theme in Kant, we are better off regarding his attack in the 
Groundwork as directed at some more specific target. The theory of Crusius 
is an excellent candidate. 
Kant objects to Crusius's theory on three grounds. He starts the argu-
ment by saying that we cannot intuit God's perfection. This starting point 
makes sense if it is Crus ius he has in mind. Crusius had proposed that we 
have a separate access to divine perfection through 'the drive of con-
science', separate from the general moral love or the disinterested drive for 
perfection (GRL 132). Kant's position is, rather, that we cannot intuit 
God's perfection, because human intuition is limited within space and 
time. This is his first objection. Our access is, therefore, through concepts. 
Either these will be the moral concepts, or some other. This presents a 
Crusius-type divine command theory with a dilemma. 
Suppose we take the first option, and reply that we can know what God 
wills, since he wills what the moral law prescribes. Here is the second 
objection. This would be, Kant says, crudely circular. He may be objecting 
to just such a crude circle in the passage from Crusius I quoted earlier, 
'Finally, the third of the basic human drives is the natural drive to recog-
nize a divine moral law' (GRL 132, emphasis added).'b Crusius adds in the 
word 'moral' at a key point in his definition without showing how he can 
simultaneously insist on the separation of the three basic drives.37 It is a 
crude circle to prove that A is B by adding B to the definition of A. What is 
needed is a 'third term' C, which can be connected first with A and then 
with B." In Kant's own account the third term is provided by our member-
ship with God in the kingdom of ends. But Crusius just gives us the crude 
circle without such mediation. 
Finally, there is a third point Kant makes against Crusius. If we think 
we can understand what God is telling us to do without using the moral 
concepts, we will be left without morality at all. Kant must have in mind 
as his target a form of the divine command theory which forbids us to jus-
tify obedience on the grounds that God cares for the well-being of the 
whole creation. In other words, we are forbidden by this form of the theo-
ry to appeal to God's practical love. A Crusius-type divine command theo-
ry insists that we should obey God's will just because it is God's will, what-
ever our direct intuition tells us that will is.39 This makes a nonsense of 
morality. The point of morality is to further one's own perfection and the 
happiness of others:" The kingdom of ends is the place where these two 
goals coincide. A morality which ignored one's own perfection and the 
happiness of others would be unintelligible. But this is just the kind of 
morality Crus ius seems to be asking us to adopt as our own. It is not that 
Crusius is here making the gross claim that what should move us to obedi-
ence is hope of reward or fear of punishment. Indeed, I started from his 
insistence, which he holds in common with Scotus, that we have sources of 
motivation other than our happiness or perfection. It is notable that Kant 
also, in his reply, does not say that his opponent bases morality on hope of 
reward or fear of punishment, but rather 'that the concept of God's will 
remaining to us will be drawn from such characteristics as lust for glory 
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and domination and bound up with frightful ideas of power and vengeful-
ness'. What Kant is interested in is what our idea of God will be like if we 
separate out the drive of conscience from the distinterested desire to help 
other people, as Crusius suggests. And we find that Crus ius does empha-
size that it is a God who will punish us if we do not obey, even though this 
is not to be our motivation for obedience."' It would have been easy for 
Kant, if he were making a general attack on divine command theory, to 
make the point about not basing morality on fear or hope of reward, and I 
suspect that is the way his argument is in fact usually taught. I used to 
teach it that way myself. But it is not what Kant says. So all three steps of 
the argument are specifically tailored to attack Crusius. 
Is Kant taking us back in this argument to a pre-Crusian Scotist form of 
divine command theory? In some ways, yes. Kant shares with Scotus the 
view that there are the two basic affections of the will, and that we start 
with the wrongful ranking of them. He shares the view that our freedom 
is tied to the good will. Two major differences are that in Kant there is no 
distinction in terms of necessity and contingency between the first and sec-
ond tables of the law. And he describes our final end not as being co-
lovers with God, but as a perfect combination of virtue and happiness. But 
there are two similarities I want to stress. In both Scotus and Kant, we 
share our final end with God, in the sense that both we and God aim at our 
own perfection. And in both Scotus and Kant God's willing is constrained 
by necessity, despite the Scotist emphasis on God's choosing the second 
table. I will return to these points at the end.42 
v. Autonomolls Relations to Political Authority 
We can see that Kant is not making submission incompatible with 
autonomy if we compare what he says our relation is to political authority. 
Autonomy is being both legislator and subject to the law. One source of 
this idea is the tradition from Aristotle and the scholastics of seeing the 
good citizen as possessing 'the knowledge and capacity requisite both for 
ruling and for being ruled. The excellence of a citizen may be defined as 
consisting in a practical knowledge of the governance of free men from 
both points of view' .13 Kant believes that the autonomy of a good citizen is 
not only consistent with submission to political authority, but requires this 
submission. He argues that coercion by the state is necessary in order to 
prevent coercion by individuals, which would be an obstacle to the exter-
nal exercise of autonomy. External compulsion by the state is thus 'a hin-
dering of the hindrances to freedom':4 To quote Mary Gregor's introduc-
tion to the Metaphysics of Morals, 'It is only within a civil condition, where 
there is a legislator to enact laws, an executive to enforce them, and a judi-
ciary to settle disputes about rights by reference to such public laws, that 
human beings can do what it can be known a priori they must be able to 
do in accordance with moral principles'.'5 The justification of the state then 
rests for Kant on moral grounds, on the freedom of each individual person 
and our obligation to respect this in each other. A citizen is in this way 
morally justified in adopting into her own will the will of her ruler. The 
analogy with God's rule is systematic. Kant gives God executive and judi-
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cial as well as legislative functions within the kingdom, and God has to 
exercise those functions in order for the subjects in this kingdom 'to do 
what it can be known a priori they must be able to do in accordance with 
moral principles.' The analogy in fact goes beyond this, though I will not 
spell this out. Just as in God's kingdom, so in an earthly kingdom there are 
three kinds of mistake a citizen might make in claiming justification for her 
obedience. They are the same three kinds of mistake Crusius makes in 
analysing our relation to God. The point I want to make here, though, is 
that Kant cannot mean to construct an argument from autonomy against 
all forms of external authority. The opposite is true. He thinks that auton-
omy requires submission to at least one kind of external authority, namely 
the authority of the state. 
The analogy with political authority is helpful in understanding the role 
of sanctions in our relation to God. As we have already seen, this is not 
supposed to be the ground of our obedience. But it is essentially tied to the 
way in which God can be the author of the obligation to obey the law in a 
way that we are not. Christine Korsgaard says, 'Why then are sanctions 
needed? The answer is that they are necessary to establish the authority of 
the legislator ... .The legislator is necessary to make obligation possible, that 
is, to make morality normative.''" She gives the example of a student who 
takes a logic course because it is required by his department. It might seem 
that he acts more autonomously if he takes it because he independently 
sees its merit. But he acts autonomously out of his practical identity as a 
student only if he places the right to make and enforce some of the deci-
sions about what he will study in the hands of his teachers. Similarly, a 
good citizen as a citizell does not pay her taxes because she thinks the gov-
ernment needs the money. She can vote for taxes for that reason. But once 
the vote is over, she must pay her taxes because it is the law. To extend 
this analysis to the context of divine command theory, we could say that an 
agent acts autonomously out of her practical identity as a citizen of God's 
kingdom only if she acts out of obedience to God. In none of these three 
cases (the student, the citizen of an earthly kingdom and the citizen of 
God's kingdom) is there any inconsistency with the agent sharing the ends 
of her superior. But in all three cases there is a true duty 'which must be 
represented as at the same time that (superior's) command.' (Rei. VI, 99). 
The role of the sanctions is to make the kingdom possible, and the ground 
of obedience is not fear of the sanctions but membership in the kingdom. 
It is worth spelling out why the kingdom of ends has to be a kingdom 
and not, for example, a republic. Kant's view is that the only earthly consti-
tution that accords with right is that of a pure republic.'7 The difference 
between republic and kingdom matters to him. It is therefore misleading 
to gloss the kingdom of ends as 'the republic of all rational beings', and to 
call a friendship 'a kingdom of two'." Between friends there is no king. J. L. 
Mackie is more accurate here. He says, 'But for the need to give God a spe-
cial place in it, (the kingdom of ends) would have been better called a com-
monwealth of ends."~ In Kant's theory God has combined in one person 
the legislative, executive and judicial functions which Kant thinks should 
be separated in a well-run earthly republic. In brief, 'We must conceive a 
Supreme Being whose laws are holy, whose government is benev(~~:::-L~ and 
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whose rewards and punishments are juSt."" 
The legislative function we have already met. But there is a key differ-
ence from the legislation of an earthly state. Ethical legislation concerns the 
heart, and not merely the behaviour of the citizenry. Kant accordingly says 
that the ruler of the ethical realm 'must be one who knows the heart, in 
order to penetrate to the most intimate parts of the disposition of each and 
everyone and, as must be in every community, give to each according to the 
worth of his actions.' God's promulgating the moral law to the heart is what 
Kant describes in the preface to the second edition of Religion as the revela-
tion to reason. There is an additional point here. God, as legislator, will not 
ask us to do what is impossible for us, though God may ask us to do what is 
impossible for us on our own. The point is that God offers us the so-to-
speak executive assistance to do what God as legislator calls us to do. 
God's executive function can be divided into various parts. One part is 
the execution of the rewards and punishments which God declares in the 
judicial function. There is also, however, the 'maintenance' of the law 
(Lectures p. 81). We have to believe that a system is in place and is being 
maintained in which the ends of the other members of the kingdom are 
consistent with each other and with ours. This is what we might call a co-
ordination problem. The world might be the kind of place in which I can 
only be happy if other people are not, or in which some of the people I 
affect by my actions can only be happy if other people I affect are not. Kant 
says that T am, as a creature of need, bound to desire my own happiness in 
everything else I desire, (though my happiness is not the only source of my 
motivation).51 And r am required to pursue the happiness of others as 
much as my own, since we ought to share each other's ends as far as the 
moral law al10wsY But we can only do all this if there is a system in place 
in which others' ends are first consistent with each other and, second, con-
sistent with our own happiness. Since we do not know the contents either 
of our own happiness or that of others, we cannot see by inspection 
whether these consistencies obtain.54 We need to presuppose, Kant says, 
the idea of a higher moral being/through whose universal organization the 
forces of single individuals, insufficient on their own, are united for a com-
mon effect.' (Rei. VI, 98) The common effect Kant has in mind here is the 
highest good, in which all are virtuous and all are happy. This is his trans-
lation of the psalmist's idea of righteousness and peace embracing each 
other (Psalm 85: 10). Kant's point is that we have to believe in God's execu-
tive functions in order to have the faith that such a good is possible. In fact, 
with this belief we can have not merely moral faith but moral hope, 
because God as Lord of history is bringing the kingdom to fruition. 
Finally, there is the judicial function. This is already implicit in what I 
have said. We have to suppose that God can see our hearts and can justly 
separate the sheep and the goats. It is not merely that God applies justly 
the standards, but that the standards God applies are just. T will sum up by 
quoting from the Second Critique, in which Kant stresses that moral right-
ness is an end common to us and to God, but that God's role is different 
and non-symmetrical with ours and is nonetheless essential to our moral 
life. 'Religion', Kant says, 'is the recognition of all duties as divine com-
mands, Dct as sanctions, i.e. arbitrary and contingent ordinances of a for-
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eign will, but as essential laws of any free will as such. Even as such, they 
must be regarded as commands of the Supreme Being, because we can 
hope for the highest good (to strive for which is our duty under moral law) 
only from a morally perfect (holy and beneficent) and omnipotent will; 
and, therefore, we can hope to attain it only through harmony with this 
will' (KpV V, 130, emphasis added). 
VI. Conclusion 
I have tried to show that Kant does not intend a general argument 
against divine command theory. I want to end by showing that the general 
argument usually but wrongly read into the Groundwork does not work. We 
can see this if we hold onto Kant's and Scotus's view that we and God are 
jointly but non-symmetrically engaged in our moral life, and that we share 
our final end with God. Autonomous submission, I want to say, is recapitu-
lating in our wills what God has willed for our willing. This kind of mutu-
ality is present in the idea of a covenant, because a covenant is between peo-
ple who share commitment to the kind of life the covenant sets up as nor-
mative. This allows us to endorse a divine command theory which is what 
Robert Adams calls 'theonomous'.'6 He says, 'Let us say that a person is 
theonomous to the extent that the following is true of him: He regards his 
moral principles as given him by God, and adheres to them partly out of 
love or loyalty to God, but he also prizes them for their own sakes, so that 
they are the principles he would give himself if he were giving himself a 
moral law. The theonomous agent, in so far as he is right, acts morally 
because he loves God, but also because he loves what God loves.'" 
I want to connect this idea of theonomy with the Scotist distinction 
between our final end of union with God and our route to that end. It 
needs a different paper to describe and evaluate the details of Scotus's 
account. But the key idea is that the second table of the law, the specifica-
tion of our duties to the neighbour, is binding on us because God has 
selected it. Contrary to some versions of natural law theory, this part of the 
law is not deducible from our human nature. God could have chosen a 
different route for beings with our nature to reach our final end. I am not 
attributing this view to Kant. But I am suggesting that if Scotus is right 
about this, then autonomy can be reconciled with a version of divine com-
mand theory. If we try to mount the argument from autonomy that is usu-
ally (but wrongly) associated with Kant, we will fail. This is because there 
is nothing heteronomous about willing to obey a superior's prescription 
because the superior has prescribed it, as long as the final end is shared 
between us. The dichotomy which the usual version of the argument relies 
upon is false. The dichotomy is the one I mentioned before in connection 
with Schneewind's view of Kant: Kanhan independence or Crusian depen-
dence; either our own wills entirely or entirely the will of another. What 
human moral life is actually like on the Scotist picture is a complex and 
rich mixture. 
The notion of recapitulating God's will in ours is, however, vague in 
various ways. There is a range of cases here. Willing is always under a 
description, and the descriptions under which two people share an end 
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may vary.58 Take the following example, which lowe to Robert C. 
Roberts. A teenager's mother wills that her son not sleep with his girl-
friend, and in willing this she wills that her son live a fully chaste life by 
Christian standards for the spiritual union properly surrounding sexual 
intercourse. Suppose her son does not share her Christian understanding. 
There is a range of possible ways in which the son might nonetheless 
repeat his mother's will. Perhaps he does not want to lose his inheritance. 
This would be crude form of heteronomy. Perhaps he respects his mother, 
though not her view. He does not want to hurt her, and he is grateful to 
her. This is neither heteronomy nor autonomous submission, but some-
where in between. Or perhaps he does accept the Christian teaching about 
sexuality, but barely understands it. He abstains because he wants to be a 
good Christian, but the proscription makes no sense to him. Here the 
mother and the son may even share a description under which something 
is willed, but it is not equally resonant for the two. Finally the son may 
share his mother's understanding as well as her prescription. But on 
Christian doctrine this kind of shared understanding is one we can never 
have completely with Cod, even in heaven. It is possible, then, to share 
ends with another person, or with Cod, with many different degrees of 
clarity and fullness. 
Suppose the son shares an end with his mother, but does not under-
stand it very well, certainly less well than she does. Is his response 
autonomous or heteronomous? For Schneewind, the answer is a matter of 
degree, as in the story I have just told, but will tend towards heteronomy. 
He constructs a picture of what he calls 'the Divine Corporation'.'9 He 
imagines a large corporation, the sort of corporation in which Dilbert is 
employed. The ordinary employees understand very little about each 
other's jobs or the purposes of the whole corporation, there is a strong 
back-up system so that failures by others will be rem.edied and ordinary 
employees do not have to feel responsible for the remedy themselves, and 
the supervisor has made it clear that they are paid for carrying out their 
duties strictly, 'looking neither to left nor to right'. This, he says, is the tra-
ditional Christian picture of the kingdom of Cod, with Cod as the head of 
the firm. Schneewind thinks progress towards autonomy occurs in the his-
tory of ethics as each of these three conditions weakens. First, we come to 
see the purpose of the 'corporation' as promoting human happiness. 
Second we see ourselves as the major instruments in producing this end or 
failing to produce it. Third we see ourselves as cooperating with each 
other in producing this end, and as responsible for repairing each other's 
omissions. In swnmary, 'As Cod's supervision and activity lessen, man's 
responsibility increases.' I do not want to deny that this movement of 
thought has occurred within academic philosophy in the last two hundred 
years. But as far as I can see, there is no way to determine whether this 
movement is progress towards a desirable kind of autonomy without set-
tling first whether there is a Cod who has created us and rules the world 
providentially in the way the traditional picture and Kant himself suggest. 
If there is, and we decline to relate ourselves to God as God's subjects, this 
is not a desirable form of autonomy but it is like the graduate student in 
Korsgaard's example refusing on the grounds of autonomy to take the 
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required courses for the degree. My main point has been that this is not 
Kant's notion of autonomy; and that if we want to say it is nonetheless a 
desirable notion of autonomy, we will have to do some prior dismantling 
of traditional theism. 
Calvin College 
NOTES 
1. Allen Wood denies that Kant is a pure rationalist, ('Kant's Deism', in 
Kant's Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered, op. cit. 11.) For arguments against 
Wood, see John Hare, The Moml Cap, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996,42-45. 
2. Religion VI, 13. I will be making references to Kant by using the page 
numbers of the relevant volume of the Academy edition. 
3. Allen Wood, 'Kant's Deism', in Kallt's Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered, 
ed. Philip). Rossi and Michael Wreen, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1991,1-21,14. See also the phrase in E. Troeltsch, 'utterances of prudence', 
quoted in Michel Despland, Kant on History and Religion, Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1973, lOS, and the phrase 'cover' techniques in 
Yirmiahu Yovet Kant and the Philosophy of History, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980, 114 and 215. Another similar strategy is to appeal to 
clumsy editing. 
4. e.g. Conflict of the Facuities VII, 10, and KrV III and TV, A748-50=B776-S. 
5. See Heinz Heimsoeth, 'Metaphysical Motives in the Development of 
Critical Idealism', in Kant: Disputed Questions, ed. M. S. Gram, Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1967. I have been influenced by a paper by Robert M. 
Adams, 'Things in Themselves', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57 
(Dec. 1997),801-25. 
6. I am going to mention Christine Korsgaard again at the end; but for an 
extended review, see Faith and Philosophy, volume 17, 3, (July 2000) 371-83. 
7. Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of NormatizJity, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996, 91; and Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996,240-1. 
S. J. B. Schneewind, 'Natural Law, Skepticism, and the Methods of Ethics', 
Journal of the History of ideas, 52 (1991) 298. Curiously, the actual treatment of 
Kant at the end of The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998) is brief, almost perfunctory. Schneewind hilS, however, 
given a fuller treatment of Kant's views on autonomy in a succession of arti-
cles, and I have made use especially of 'The Divine Corporation ilnd the 
History of Ethics', in Philosophy and History, ed. Richard Rorty,]. B. Schneewind 
and Quentin Skinnner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 173-92, 
'Natural Law, Skepticism, and Methods of Ethics' op. cit., and 'Autonomy, 
Obligiltion and Virtue: An Overview of Kant's Ethics', in The Cambridge 
Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992, 309-41. 
9. Ibid. 302, emphasis added. In The Invention of Autonomy, Schneewind 
does not emphasize the language of creation, but he does say that Kant agrees 
with his predecessors who hold that moral approval is 'like the Pufendorfian 
divine will that creates moral entities', so that 'our approval is what makes 
some motives good, others bad/, op. cit. 524. 
10. Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield, p. 51-2. 
11. Kant says that practical reason (the will) should be allowed to 'simply 
474 Faith and Philosophy 
manifest its own sovereign authority as the supreme maker of law', and earlier 
he glosses this notion of the will making the law in terms of the will being its 
author, Gl IV, 441 and 431. Patrick Kain has traced with great elegance the 
emergence of the new way of making the distinction, in the fifth chapter of his 
dissertation from the University of Notre Dame (1999). For example, in the 
fragment of lecture notes referred to as 'Moral Mrongovius II', Kant is reported 
to have said to his students in 1785 (while he was writing the Groundwork), 
'The lawgiver is not the author of the law, rather he is the author of the obliga-
tion of the law (Autor del' obligation des Gezetzes)', XXIX 633-4. The new way of 
stating the distinction becomes standard for him, as in the following passage 
from the Metaphysics of Morals (1797), 'A (morally practical) law is a proposition 
that contains a categorical imperative (a command). One who commands 
(imperans) through a law is the lawgiver (legislator). He is the author (autor, sic) 
of the obligation in accordance with the law (Urheber (autor) der Verbilldlichkeit 
nach dem Gesetz), but not always the author of the law. In the latter case the law 
would be a positive (contingent) and chosen law. A law that binds us a priori 
and unconditionally by our own reason can also be expressed as proceeding 
from the will of a supreme lawgiver, that is, one who has only rights and no 
duties (hence from the divine will); but this signifies only the Idea of a moral 
being whose will is a law for everyone, without his being thought as the author 
of the law.' Here we have essentially the same distinction between lawgiver 
and author, but now expressed in terms of two kinds of authorship (MM VI, 
227). 
12. GllV,433-4. 
13. KpVV, 143. 
14. See Don Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, (London: SCM Press, 1980, 9), 'A 
modern person must not any more surrender the apex of his self-consciousness 
to a god. It must remain his own.' 
15. John Austin, How to do Things with Words, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1965,3. 
16. See R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981,67. 
17. Karl Ameriks, 'On Schneewind and Kant's Method in Ethics', Ideas y 
Valores, no. 102 Dec. 1996,48. 
18. Paton already remarked on this importance, see Immanuel Kant, 
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. and analysed by H. J. Paton, 
Harper, New York: 1964, p.141. For Crusius's views, see the selection from 
'Guide to Rational Living', in Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, vol II, ed. 
J. B. Schneewind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 568-585 
(henceforth GRL). See also Giorgio Tonelli, 'La Question des bornes de l'enten-
dement humain au XVIIIe siecle', Revue de metaphysique et de morale (1959), 396-
427. In the Second Critique (KpV V, 40), Kant mentions Crusius as the source 
of the view which locates the practical material determining ground of morali-
ty externally in the will of God. See also Momlphilosophie Col/ins, KGS 262-3, 
'Crusius believes that all obligation is related to the will of another (die Willkiir 
cines andernY. 
19. J. B. Schneewind, 'Autonomy, Obligation, and Virtue', op. cit., 312-3. 
20. For Luther, the route is through Ockham. The nominalist tradition or 
via moderna was adopted by Gregory of Rimini, who was General of the 
Hermits of St. Augustine, which was Luther's order a century and a half later. 
Gabriel Bid, at Tubingen, wrote an influential exposition of Ockham's system, 
which was taught at Erfurt (by two of Luther's professors, Jaadokus Trutfetter 
and Bartholomaeus Arnoldi) and at Wittenberg (where Luther did most of his 
teaching). See especially Heiko Oberman, Luther: A Man Between God and the 
Devil, Eileen Walliser-Schwarzenbart, trans., New York: Doubleday, 1989, 118-
DUTiES AS GOD'S COMMANDS 475 
19. For Calvin, the influence through John Major and the College de Montaigu 
was stated by Francois Wendel, Calvin, trans. Philip Mairet, New York: Harper 
and Row, 1950, and fully worked out by Karl Reuter, in Das Grundverstaendnis 
der Theologie Calvins, Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener-Verlag, 1963. An 
enthusiastic advocate is Thomas Torrance, in The Hermeneutics of John Cal'l'in, 
Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1988, and also Alexander Broadie, The 
Shadow of Scotus, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995. A more sceptical reading of 
the evidence can be found in A. Ganoczy, 'Le jeune Calvin: Genese et evolution 
de sa vocation reformatrice', Wiesbaden, 1966, and A. N. S. Lane, 'Calvin's Use 
of the Fathers and the Medievals', Calvin Theological jourlll1116 (1981) 149-205. 
21. WA 2, 493, 12ff. 
22. Schneewind, 'The Divine Corporation and the History of Ethics', op. cit., 
176. 
23. GRL 176 and 216. 
24. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (henceforth, GI) 443. 
25. For a statement of the problem with understanding the passage in the 
Euthyphro 10a1-11b5, see John E. Hare, Plato's Euthyphro, Bryn Mawr 
Commentaries, 1985,21-25. 
26. Crusius also took the extreme position on the authority of Scripture that 
no rational criticism of the Bible was permitted, and that its meaning could be 
penetrated only by a kind of empathy or inner light. Kant objects to this claim 
as well, but not in the same argument. 
27. R M. Hare in The Simple Believer', reprinted in Essays on Religion and 
Education, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, 30. This argument in the Groundwork 
has had the same kind of status in Ethics as the treatment of the Ontological 
Argument in the First Critique has had in Metaphysics. 
28. It is a dubious empirical claim that the usage of most people in the 
world divorces morality from divine command. Perhaps this is true of most 
professional philosophers? Other examples of the kind of interpretation I am 
objecting to are A. C. Ewing, Value and Reality, London: Allen and Unwin, 1973, 
183-187, and James Rachels, 'God and Human Attitudes', reprinted in Divine 
Conmlands and Morality, ed. Paul Helm, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 34-48, 
especially 44f. One vivid example is Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 
New York: Schocken Books, 1971, 80, 'Kant's man had already nearly a century 
earlier received a glorious incarnation in the work of Milton: his proper name 
is Lucifer.' The argument itself, without explicit attachment to Kant, is perva-
sive. One nice statement of it is in P. H. Nowell-Smith's Ethics, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1954, 192-3. 
29. Sorting Out Ethics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997,27. 
30. Lewis White Beck, Six Secular Philosophers, New York: Harper, 1960, 72-
4. But it is not in general true for Kant that a prescription has authority only if 
we know about its source. As I shall argue, Kant thinks that the prescriptions 
of a legitimate political ruler have authority and have their source in his will; 
but we do not have knowledge about this will. 
31. Kant does use the 'as if' locution counterfactually, but to express what 
our moral lives would be like without God, 'each must, on the contrary, so con-
duct himself as if everything depended on him.'(Rel. VI, 101, where the point is 
that everything does not depend on the agent). At ReI. VI, 154 Kant makes the 
point that no assertoric knowledge is required in religion so far as theoretical 
cognition and profession of faith are concerned, since all that is required is a 
problematic assumption; but with respect to the object towards which our 
morally legislative reason bids us work, what is presupposed is an assertoric 
faith. He goes on (it is true) to say that this faith needs only the idea of God. But 
this again is an epistemological limitation, not a point about what we should 
476 Faith and Philosophy 
believe exists. 
32. KrVIII (second ed.), xxx. 
33. There are problems with the argument on this second horn. What 
needs to be attended to is the different ways in which we can separate God's 
will from the moral concepts. On God's side we can distinguish the claim that 
the divine will is inconsistent with what is morally right from the claim that 
this willing, though consistent, does not go through the moral concepts. On 
our side we can distinguish the claim that we have to obey even if God's will is 
inconsistent with what is morally right from the claim that we must obey even 
in cases where we cannot determine whether it is consistent with what is 
morally right or not. 
34. Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1963, 
97. 
35. KpV V, 130. ReI. VI, 154. 
36. See Lewis White Beck, A Commentary 011 Kant's Critique of Practical 
Reason, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1960, 107, 'Either Crusius surrepti-
tiously introduces ethical predicates into the concept of divine perfection' (and 
Beck refers to this passage of Crusius), 'with the result that theological perfec-
tion no longer grounds the moral principle but presupposes it; or a hedonistic 
motivation is postulated as the ground of obedience to God.' But Kant is not 
exactly accusing Crusius of this second error, as I will argue in the following 
paragraph. 
37. 'It is thus not specially necessary to show that the drive of conscience is 
distinct from the previously distinguished basic drives, as its object is so very 
different from those of the other drives.' (GRL 134) 
38. An instructive comparison is Kant's fear in the third section of 
Groundwork that he may have argued in a circle about morality and freedom 
(Gl IV, 450). Kant thinks he has extricated himself from the viciousness of this 
circle when he later points out that 'when we think of ourselves as free, we 
transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members' (GI IV, 453). He gives 
us here a third term which mediates between morality and freedom, namely 
our membership in the intelligible world. 
39. See Robert M. Adams, 'Autonomy and Theological Ethics', in The 
Virtlle of Faith, Oxford University Press: 1987, 123-7. Adams approves of 
Tillich's notion of theonomous ethics, 'The theonomous agent acts morally 
because he loves God, but also because he loves what God loves.' Kant on my 
reading, but not Crusius, has a theonomous ethics. I will rehlrn to Adams at 
the end of this paper. Crusius himself would not be worried by this objection. 
See Tonelli, op.cit. 410 (my translation), 'Crusius underlines the importance of 
mysteries of reaSOIl, mainly theological doctrines which have to be admitted, 
even though we do not understand how certain things can be joined together 
or separated in such a way.' 
40. This is to put the point in terms of the matter of morality, rather than its 
form (which is more usual in the Groundwork). See the Metaphysics of Morals 
VI,398. 
41. The motive of conscience', he says, is therefore merely a motive to rec-
ognize certain indebtednesses, that is, such universal obligations as one must 
observe even if one does not wish to collsider the advantages and disadvantages deriv-
ing from them, whose transgression God will punish and, if his law is not to be in 
vain, must punish.' (GRL 133, emphasis added). 
42. In the Lectures on Ethics (op. cit. 22) Kant distinguishes between positive 
(or contingent) obligation and natural obligation, which arises from the nature 
of the action itself; and then complains, 'Crusius believes that all obligation is 
related to the will of another. So in his view all obligation would be a necessi-
DUTIES AS GOD'S COMMANDS 477 
tation per arbitrium altaius. It may indeed seem that in ,111 obligation we are 
necessitated per arbitrillm alterill~; but in fact I am necessitated by an arbitrilllll 
illternum, not externum, and thus by the necessary condition of universal will.' 
What Kant is objecting to here, on my view, is not in itself the appeal to a supe-
rior will, but to making this will merely external, or separate from the universal 
will. In Kant's own way of recognizing our duties as God's commands, this 
can be and should be consistent with seeing them as permitted by the moral 
law, and thus the universal will. To put this more simply, what Kant wants in 
our autonomous submission is both our will and God's together, neither of 
them being sufficient without the other. 
43. Aristotle Politics III, 2, 1277b14-16. 
44. MM VI. 396. See also MM VI, 231, '(Whatever) counteracts the hin-
drance of an effect promotes that effect and is consistent with it.' 
45. Mary Gregor, translator's introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 10. 
46. Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of N0r17111tivity, 01'. cit., 25f and 105-7. 
She goes on to argue against Hobbes and Pufendorf that our moral obligations 
have authority because of the internal sanction of a painful conscience. But 
Kant, I am arguing, preserves the need for an external imposition of sanctions, 
though they are not arbitrary sanctions (KpV V, 130). The fact that we feel 
badly if we break the law is not, for him, enough. The presence of these sanc-
tions does not by itself lead to heteronomy, unless the ground for obedience is 
the fear of hell or hope of heaven. 
47. See MM VI, 340-42. It is significant also that Kant denies that the church 
should have a monarchical constitution, Rei. VI, 102. 
48. See Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, op. cit., 99 and 127. Note also 
R. M. Hare, Sorting Out Ethics, op. cit., 26, The Kingdom of Ends is not really a 
kingdom, but a democracy with equality before the law.' 
49. J. L. Mackie, f.thies, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1977,45. 
50. Lectures on Ethics, op. cit. 79-80. See also ReI. VI, 139. 
51. KpV V, 25. There is an apparent difficulty here about whether Kant's 
argument is consistent. I have tried to layout the argument in The Moral Cap, 
op. cit. ,69-96. Kant wants to say both that we inevitably desire our own happi-
ness and that this desire should be subordinated to duty, which has (as in 
Crusius) a separate spring of motivation. 
52. This is one of the two ingredients in the matter of morality described in 
the Metaphysics of Morals (VI, 385-6). 
53. If one holds, like Thomas Reid, that there are many self-evident but log-
ically independent moral axioms, then God is required to ensure their consis-
tency. 
54. Kp V V, 36. 
55. Kant says that the kingdom of heaven is represented 'not only as being 
brought ever nearer in an approach delayed at certain times yet never wholly 
interrupted, but also as arriving', ReI. VI, 134. 
56. Adams takes the term 'theonomy' from Tillich in the article already 
referred to. There are also two important papers, 'A Modified Divine 
Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness' and 'Divine Command Metaethics 
Modified Again', both of which are reprinted (the second only in part) in 
Helm, op. cit. See also Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999. Other contemporary philosophers have defended ver-
sions of divine command theory. Baruch A. Brody's views can be found in 
'Morality and Religion Reconsidered'. Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. 
Baruch A. Brody, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1974, 592-603. Philip 
Quinn's views can be found in Divine Commal/ds and Moral Requirements, 
478 Faith and Philosophy 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. See also Paul Rooney, Divine Command 
Morality, Aldershot: Avebury, 1996, and Richard L. Mouw, The God Who 
Commands, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1990. For a version of 
the present paper in the context of a discussion of Duns Scotus and twentieth 
century moral theory, see John E. Hare, God's Call, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2000. 
57. Adams, op. cit. Autonomous submission to political authority has the 
same structure. 
58. Scotus says, nihil volitu11l quin praecognitum, (nothing is willed but what 
is pre-cognized), opus oxon. II, d. 25, q. u. n. 19. 
59. Schneewind, The Divine Corporation and the History of Ethics', op. cit. 
